We were brought into an eight-plant polymers and chemicals producer to run a data maturity programme ahead of an S/4HANA implementation. What follows is the gap analysis and the outcome model, with the client removed and every figure converted to US dollars.

The five gaps

The asset register looked healthy from the executive dashboards and was not. Five measurable gaps carried almost all of the risk, and one of them was not being counted at all.

Master data quality95.4%
Black marker shows the 66.75% starting point. This is the one gap that has been closed.
PM plan coverage on active assets49%
Just over half of running equipment had no maintenance plan attached.
BOM completeness26%
Three quarters of assets could not tell a planner which spare they needed.
Master data quality was fixed in the first phase. Plan coverage and BOM completeness were not, and they are where the remaining exposure sits.

What the gaps were costing

Over the reference period the site recorded 81 days of downtime against roughly 61 million dollars of production loss exposure, an implied 757 thousand dollars for every day lost. Slightly over half of those days traced back to equipment failure rather than market, feedstock or planned outage.

41 days equipment failure40 days other causes
The 41 equipment-failure days represent about 31 million dollars of exposure. That is the pool a data maturity programme can credibly work on. The other 40 days are outside its reach and were excluded from the model.

Gap findings, in order of consequence

Maintenance plans absent on half the running assets

Coverage at 49% means preventive work was being scheduled from memory and habit rather than from the system. Closing this and BOM completeness together accounts for more than 70% of the recoverable loss in the model.

Bills of material largely unbuilt

At 26% completeness, planners could not reserve parts against a job. Wrench time was lost to store room trips and emergency procurement rather than to maintenance.

Inventory growing on the back of the missing BOMs

This is the gap that shows up in the finance report rather than the maintenance one, and it is the direct downstream consequence of BOM completeness sitting at 26 percent. With no reliable link between an asset and the parts it consumes, stocking decisions get made defensively. Buyers order against memory and worst case rather than against a bill of material, reorder points are set without consumption history to justify them, and nothing has an owner who can prove a part is no longer needed.

The result compounds quietly. Inventory value climbs while availability of the parts actually wanted stays flat, slow and non moving stock accumulates against assets that may already have been modified or retired, and write off exposure builds on a balance sheet nobody is reviewing against the asset register. None of this appeared in the downtime model, because carrying cost and obsolescence are a separate loss pool from production loss.

No BOM on the asset
No asset to spare link
Defensive stocking
Slow and non moving stock
Rising inventory value and write off exposure

The chain runs one way. Nothing downstream of the first link can be fixed by inventory policy alone, which is why stock reduction drives that skip the bill of material tend to rebound within two years.

The outcome. Inventory value and slow and dead stock had grown every year across the five years preceding the programme. Nine months after the data maturity work went live, inventory value fell year on year for the first time in five years. Of everything the programme produced, this is the number that reached the balance sheet rather than the maintenance report, and it is the one a finance director will ask about first.

Master data quality below usable threshold

Starting at 66.75%, roughly a third of records could not be trusted for reporting. Rebuilt against an ISO 14224 taxonomy, this reached 95.4% in the first phase.

Failure attribution never established

No sampled root cause review existed linking downtime days to data-addressable causes. Without it, any benefit case rests on an industry assumption rather than the plant's own evidence. We flagged this as the single largest source of uncertainty in the model.

The warehouse is where the strategy shows up

If you want to know whether an asset management strategy is real, do not read the maintenance report. Walk the warehouse. Every weakness upstream lands there eventually, as stock that was bought against a guess, held against an asset nobody re-checked, and written off years later by someone who never knew why it was ordered. The warehouse is the slowest and most honest indicator of asset management performance there is.

On this programme it was also the first place the work showed up in money.

The starting position

Nine out of every ten items in stock were slow moving. The international benchmark sits near fifteen percent. That gap is not a procurement failure, it is what happens when parts are bought and stored without a maintenance strategy telling anyone which asset needs them.

Slow moving share of inventory, at start90%
International benchmark15%
Six times the benchmark. Stock was being held against equipment that in many cases had no bill of material, and in some cases no longer existed in the form the part was bought for.

What was built

62,154 bills of material were rebuilt against vendor documentation and operational recommendations, taking BOM coverage of the maintainable asset base to 26 percent. Three spare classes were configured so the structure could carry a real stocking policy rather than a flat parts list.

Operational spares46,312
Life cycle and capital spares13,989
Single line BOM2,563
Separating operational spares from life cycle and capital spares is what lets a planner stock differently for a part consumed monthly and a part held once for a ten year overhaul. Without that split, everything defaults to the cautious answer, and the cautious answer is what fills a warehouse.

What it moved

Coverage at 26 percent is not a finished job. It was still enough to break a five year trend. Inventory value fell by 2.4 million dollars, the first reduction in five years, and the first driven by data rather than by a spending freeze. Modelled forward at a conservative two percent volume reduction a year, the same work carries roughly 17.9 million dollars over five years, and materially more if the stocking philosophy is implemented aggressively.

Realised in year oneUSD 2.4M
Achieved. First inventory reduction in five years.
Five year projection, conservativeUSD 17.9M
Modelled at 2% inventory volume reduction per year.
Five year upside, aggressive strategyUSD 53.3M
Requires the full stocking philosophy, not just the data.
Only the first bar has happened. The other two are projections and are labelled as such deliberately, because the difference between them is execution, not analysis.

Where the value actually sits

Worth noting what the BOM work pays for. Inventory reduction is the visible headline, but it is the smallest share. Most of the return comes from spares being findable and correct when a job is planned.

Spares optimisation40%
Rework and repeat jobs avoided20%
Downtime and MTTR reduction20%
Planning efficiency10%
Inventory optimisation and dead stock10%
The balance sheet result is the one that gets the meeting. The wrench time result is the one that pays for the programme.

What the model says is recoverable

Against the 31 million dollar equipment-failure pool, and using a realisation rate between 25 and 40 percent, the programme models annual loss avoidance of roughly 7.8 to 12.4 million dollars once the remaining gaps are closed.

0USD 7.8MUSD 12.4MUSD 31M exposure
The violet band is the modelled annual range. The bar as a whole is the equipment-failure exposure. We present a range rather than a single figure on purpose: a point estimate invites an argument about the number instead of a decision about the work.

What is delivered and what is modelled. The move from 66.75% to 95.4% master data quality is a delivered outcome. The loss avoidance range is a projection built on three adjustable inputs: the share of failure days addressable by data quality, the realisation rate, and the ramp. It should be recalibrated against a sampled root cause review of the 41 failure days before anyone commits to it. Neither figure includes inventory carrying cost, obsolescence or write off. Those sit outside the production loss pool entirely and were tracked separately, so the inventory result reported above is additional to the range shown here rather than part of it.

Figures converted to US dollars at the fixed rate applying in the operating jurisdiction. The client, its location and its plant identifiers have been removed.